CA Court of Appeal Stats and Opinions, New Site.

scale_pix3;lawandbeliefAs the California Court of Appeal statistics detract from our main page, a new site has been created which will be used exclusively for Court of Appeal matters and will allow more oversight for the interested readers. The site can be accessed here:  The posts relating to California Courts of Appeal will be moved to the site.



By San Bernardino and Riverside Superior Court News Posted in Family Law, Law, News

1034 DAYS; 89,337,600 seconds; 1,488,960 minutes; 24,816 hours.

This is the time that the Fourth District Division two court of appeal has been sitting on one custody appeal, described here: The appeal was consolidated with a restraining order appeal which has also been pending for 754 days.

Under any relevant legal standard this appeal needs to be reversed. However it is more relevant to engage in judicial retaliation and discrimination to protect the trial court rather than addressing the law as demonstrated by the recent rulings that have originated from this court. Children can NEVER obtain that time back nor can any affected parent especially considering some of the heinous circumstances described in this case.

Court of Appeal, Superior Court and Supreme Court News


    • 87,436,800 seconds
    • 1,457,280 minutes
    • 24,288 hours

This is the time that the Fourth District Division two court of appeal has been sitting in one custody appeal, described here:  The appeal was consolidated with a restraining order appeal which has also been pending for 733 days.

Under any relevant legal standard this appeal needs to be reversed. However it is more relevant to engage in judicial retaliation and discrimination to protect the trial court rather than addressing the law as demonstrated by the recent rulings that have originated from this court. Children can NEVER obtain that time back nor can any affected parent especially considering some of the heinous circumstances described in this case.

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By San Bernardino and Riverside Superior Court News Posted in Family Law, Law, News

Shared parenting during a divorce.

Shared parenting, on paper, is a good concept as both parents under California law have the right to children, (and vice versa);  and the right to a parent child relationship is protected under our fourteenth amendment. Our constitution in this country guarantees that the relationship between parents and their children is accorded a protected preferential status.The fourteenth amendment substantive due process right to a protected familial parent child relationship was already recognized in IDK, Inc. v. County of Clark, 836 F.2d 1185, 1192 (9th Cir. Nev. 1988) and Carey v.Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 684-685 (1977), where the United States Supreme Court repeatedly teaches that there is “a right of personal privacy” which includes “family relationships,” and child rearing and education.   Our California legislature recognizes shared parenting as a mandatory right according  to CA family code section 3020  (b) which specifies :

(b) The Legislature finds and declares that it is the public
policy of this state to assure that children have frequent and
continuing contact with both parents after the parents have separated
or dissolved their marriage, or ended their relationship, and to
encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child
rearing in order to effect this policy, except where the contact
would not be in the best interest of the child, as provided in
Section 3011.

Continue reading

“When they can’t get into court to have those issues heard … it’s a violation of those rights.”

These are the profound words of our current Riverside Superior Court Presiding Judge, Mark Cope.

The below statement was part of a comment on the current budget crisis in our Superior Court, published in the Gavel Grab.

“People have a civil right, and therefore a constitutional right to have
their issues resolved in a fair way,” the presiding judge in Riverside
County, Mark Cope, said. “When they can’t get into court to have those
issues heard … it’s a violation of those rights.”

On his online running platform, under justice, Judge Cope advocates that “The role of a judge is not to make law, but to apply it”.

Although as litigants we truly appreciate the sentiment, the reality that parents and children deal with in the Riverside Superior Court is very different. Our cases are not heard and most of us have our constitutional rights violated on a day to day basis, with cases languishing for years as the Court refuses to address the legal standard required to overturn heinous criminal custody orders where parents and their children alike suffer and are tormented. The sentiment is to sweep everything under a rug hoping that we will go away or to perpetuate the malicious legal rape and battery that has become the norm. For most of us giving up on our children is not a possibility, as our children as parents are all we care about, and the Court is our only option.

Our constitution in this country guarantees that the relationship between parents and their children is accorded a protected preferential status and we have the first amendment right to have our cases addressed. The fourteenth amendment substantive due process right to a protected familial parent child relationship was already recognized in IDK, Inc. v. County of Clark, 836 F.2d 1185, 1192 (9th Cir. Nev. 1988) and Carey v.Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 684-685 (1977), where the United States Supreme Court repeatedly teaches that there is “a right of personal privacy” which includes “family relationships,” and child rearing and education.

We expect justice and we expect that the court addresses the law and that our protected rights under the constitution be treated that way. That scenario does not exist in the Riverside Superior Court. Why for example is a litigant denied access to the Court system for a year, while their paperwork vegetates on a desk somewhere?

Why are our children forced to suffer due to the heinous orders initiated by a court that violated all due process accorded by the relevant statute and the fourteenth amendment equal protection standard, merely as the relevant judicial officer wanted to teach a parent a lesson and was fixated on punishing a litigant with his/her children?

Why can none of us obtain the legal relief in the interest of justice that we are entitled to under the statute as there was a blatant miscarriage of justice which the court can correct pursuant to CCP section 128.(a)(8) and CA family code section 3022 and the Court refuses that we file the appropriate and necessary litigation to address these orders?

Words, your Honor are meaningless, unless the appropriate action mirroring those words is implemented, and we are accorded the relief that we are constitutionally entitled to.

By San Bernardino and Riverside Superior Court News Posted in Family Law, Law, News

Rule 8.260. Opinions [Reserved]

So specifies title eight rule 8.260, meaning that the opinion section of title eight rules of court has not been established yet, nor the formal policy governing said opinions and how they are supposed to be applied to litigants.

Anyone who is familiar with our Fourth District Court of Appeal in Riverside knows that the court has a policy of releasing tentative opinions before they are binding to allow a litigant the opportunity to disagree at oral argument.

Most litigants can agree that in theory this is a good policy. It provides litigants with an overview of the direction that the panel is leaning to before an official subjective opinion is reached. However, as many of us had the considerable misfortune to experience the court of appeal fails to address any mistakes, ambiguities or outright fabrications at oral argument. Instead the time of the litigant is wasted, as is the time of the three panel judiciary who has to reconstitute itself every so often in a judicial conga shuffle, to allow a different panel to hear oral argument. The fact is no one likes to hear that they have made a mistake and a justice will simply not correct his/her errors. Continue reading

By San Bernardino and Riverside Superior Court News Posted in Family Law, Law, News

Calling for legislative changes to the VLS statute.

Most CA family law parents who have been muzzled by a trial court have been deemed vexatious. The purpose is to place a legal gag order on parents as generally in most cases there is court corruption or heinous rulings that the court desperately wants to cover up, hence the legal muzzling.

Originally the vexatious litigant statute (VLS) in CA was intended to apply to litigants who sued judges; and upon a proposal by the Los Angeles county bar association the VLS statute in CA was born.

The court’s ability to make such a determination originated from an obscure and little-known state statute. In 1963, the California legislature passed the Vexatious Litigant Statute (“VLS”), defining and regulating vexatious litigants. In 1990, the California Legislature amended the VLS to provide state court judges the power to issue “prefiling orders,” which, once issued, bar individuals previously or contemporaneously classified as vexatious litigants from filing additional complaints without first obtaining leave from the court where the litigation is proposed to be filed. The VLS is relatively unique among state statutes. Over the years the judicial council has amended its application to include family law proceedings where it  cannot be applied as family law is dynamic and the underlying family law or appeal case litigation is not addressed in the VLS statute. The review process and changes by the judicial council can be viewed in previous changes to the statute.

Our California Supreme Court has specified that the vexatious litigant application cannot be applied in one CIVIL case as defined in the Shalant court. For the purposes of defining civil law, family law is contained in Civil law as helpfully specified by the legal aid society. Civil law refers to almost all other disputes—these are the rules that apply when one  person sues another person, a business or agency. This can cover a housing case such as
for eviction or foreclosure, a family case such as divorce or custody, consumer problems  such as debt or bankruptcy, or when someone sues for money because of damage to  property or personal harm. All of these cases go to a Civil Court.

The Shalant opinion specified:  “Reading the vexatious litigant statutes as a collective whole, defendants’ construction is not a plausible one. If “litigation” as defined in section 391, subdivision (a) included every motion or other procedural step taken during an action or special proceeding, and that definition were applied throughout the vexatious litigant statutes, several provisions would take on absurd, unworkable, or clearly unintended meanings. Under section 391, subdivision (b)(1), a person could be declared a vexatious litigant for losing five motions—all of which might have been filed in the same lawsuit—in a seven-year period. Section 391, subdivision (b)(3)’s reference to “motions, pleadings, or other papers” filed in the course of a litigation would make little sense if every motion, pleading, or paper filed was itself a new litigation. Under section 391.1, the defendant could move for an order requiring the plaintiff to post security each time the plaintiff filed a motion or took any other procedural step. The trial court would then have to hold a hearing—separate from any hearing on the motion itself—and determine whether the plaintiff was reasonably likely to prevail on the motion or other procedural step. (§ 391.2.) On a negative finding, the court would then be required to order the plaintiff to furnish security, presumably cumulative to any ordered at earlier stages of the action. (§ 391.3.) If the plaintiff failed to provide the security, the action would, according to section 391.4, be “dismissed,” though the negative ruling on a motion is ordinarily referred to as a “denial” rather than a “dismissal.”

Under section 391.7 itself, defendants’ construction of “litigation” would be unworkable. A vexatious litigant in Shalant’s position, having filed the action through counsel but then having lost representation, would be required to seek permission of the presiding judge before filing any motion or other paper. The presiding judge of the court would thus be placed in the position of overseeing each procedural step of an action pending in another department and deciding in each instance whether the particular motion, pleading, or paper had “merit.” (§ 391.7, subd. (b).)[5] If the clerk inadvertently filed any motion or other paper from the plaintiff, a notice from any other party that the plaintiff was subject to a prefiling order would automatically stay the “litigation” (§ 391.7, subd. (c))—that is, the particular motion filed or other procedural step taken—but the rest of the action would not necessarily be stayed at the same time. Pretrial and trial proceedings would be constantly interrupted for trips to the presiding judge’s department; an orderly and efficient trial would be impossible. Again, the statute provides that if permission is not granted, an inadvertently filed litigation is to be “dismissed” (ib id.), indicating the drafters did not intend each motion, which would ordinarily be granted or denied, but not “dismissed,” to be considered a separate “litigation.”

(11) Section 391.7, then, is not reasonably susceptible to a reading under which a prefiling order would bar the vexatious litigant from filing motions or other papers in propria persona even when the action (or special proceeding (see §§ 22, 23)) was itself properly filed through counsel. Any ambiguity on this point, moreover, would be dispelled by examination of the legislative history behind section 391.7’s enactment, which shows a clear focus on precluding vexatious litigants from filing in propria persona unmeritorious new “actions” or “lawsuits.”[7] Nowhere in this history is there any suggestion the new section would bar vexatious litigants from filing motions or papers in pending litigation.

The additional remedy provided by section 391.7 was, instead, “directed at precluding the initiation of a meritless lawsuit and the costs associated with defending such litigation.” (Bravo v. Ismaj, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 222, italics added.); Shalant v. Girardi, (2011) 253 P. 3d 266).

Technically assuming that the legal construction of the VLS statute holds as outlined in the Shalant court, the VLS statute cannot be applied to family law cases as a person would have to be married and divorced 5 times in seven year to qualify as a vexatious litigant pursuant to CCP § 391 (a). California has a mandatory six months waiting period before a dissolution judgment can be granted once a divorce petition has been filed therefore it is a legal impossibility to remarry and divorce 5 times in seven years.

The specific reason why the VLS statute cannot be applied in family law cases and in appellate case has been detailed below. Continue reading

Judge Dale Wells’ vexatious non noticed expartes

WELLSCARICATURE2Judge Wells has a history of violating family law rules and procedures to suit his particular capricious frame of mind.  One such tool is the illegal exparte practice that he has implemented over a decade as the policy and procedure in the Superior Court.

He has removed children from parents based solely on his vexatious interpretation of CA family code 3064, which actually states that the Court shall REFRAIN from executing an exparte unless there is a risk of  immediate harm to the child or immediate risk that the children will be taken out of the State of California.

He himself has executed non noticed expartes based solely on his whim and particular retaliation against a parent.  However, none of his fictitious procedures are based on the law as mandatory due process notification is required defined by  California rules of court 3.1203-3.1204 and the application requirements specified in CA rules of court Rule 3.1201 which specifies that the exparte application MUST be in writing before the hearing and that notification of said exparte must take place before 10 am the prior day BEFORE the exparte hearing.  However, Judge Wells has over a ten year period instituted non noticed expartes at hearings, that have a completely different purpose out of sheer spite and retaliation; harmfully, oppressively and maliciously sanctioning parents with their own children; without any evidence to substantiate his truly malicious accusations.

Of course the Riverside Superior court fails to address the judicial carnage and battery exhibited by a judicial officer that is being paid in excess of $180,000.00 for that particular privilege.


Proposed Proposal to Judicial Council to abolish forced mediator recommendation proposed orders in CA family law cases, input from public requested.


The CA Judicial council allows the public to provide a proposal under CA rules of court 10.21 relating to rules, forms etc and a draft proposal and the request to abolish the forced adoption of mediator recommendation proposed orders has been presented below. Please provide your comments or feedback to be incorporated as applicable.

Pursuant to California Rules of court 10.21, the members of the public hereby present a proposal to abolish the forced mediation process in all family law cases in California.

The trial court system in the State of California has a policy of forcing family law parties into mediation once a request for order is filed.  An informal poll publicly offered to evaluate the mediation process,  illustrates that mediation is not effective nor does it comply with the law as defined in California rules of court 5.210 . In 38% of cases mediation did not comply with the CA rules of court; in 25% of cases there was no agreement at mediation and a recommendation was made; in 25% of cases there was no agreement at the hearing or in writing and the recommendation was adopted as the order of the court.

The term used to describe the process is child custody recommendation counseling which is still defined as mediation pursuant to CA family code § 3183.

The purpose of mediation is defined in CA family code § 3161 as follows:

(a) To reduce acrimony that may exist between the parties.

(b) To develop an agreement assuring the child close and continuing contact with both parents that is in the best interest of the child, consistent with Sections 3011 and 3020.

(c) To effect a settlement of the issue of visitation rights of all parties that is in the best interest of the child.

The sole purpose according to the statute is to reach an agreement between the parties. However the Superior Courts have implemented a policy of developing mediator’s recommendations after each mediation which proposes an order to the judge assigned to the case.  The basis of this concept is allegedly based on  CA family code § 3183 as follows:

(a) Except as provided in Section 3188, the mediator may, consistent with local court rules, submit a recommendation to the court as to the custody of or visitation with the child, if  the mediator has first provided  the parties and their  attorneys, including counsel for any minor children, with the  recommendations in writing in advance of the hearing. The court shall make an inquiry at the hearing as to whether the parties and their attorneys have received the recommendations in writing. If the mediator is authorized to submit a recommendation to the court pursuant to this subdivision, the mediation and recommendation process shall be referred to as “child custody recommending counseling” and the mediator shall be referred to as a “child custody recommending counselor.”

Mediators who make those recommendations are considered mediators for purposes of Chapter 11 (commencing with Section 3160), and shall be subject to all requirements for mediators for all purposes under this code and the California Rules of Court. On and after January 1, 2012, all court communications and information regarding the child custody recommending counseling process shall reflect the change in the name of the process and the name of the providers.

(b) If the parties have not reached agreement as a result of the mediation proceedings, the mediator may recommend to the  court that an investigation be conducted pursuant to Chapter 6 (commencing with Section 3110)or that other services be offered  to assist the parties to effect a resolution of the controversy before a hearing on the issues.

(c) In appropriate cases, the mediator may recommend that restraining orders be issued, pending determination of the controversy, to protect the well-being of the child involved in the controversy.

CA family code § 3183 specifies that the mediator has to notify the court that the parties have not reached an agreement underlining the sole purpose of mediation, which is to attempt to reach an agreement and only specifies the word “may” as the policy of providing recommendations to the trial court, not a mandatory “shall”. CA evidence code  § 1119 and § 1121 defines the word shall in the context of mediation.

However, the trial courts in the State of California abuse the mediation process, forcing mediation when no agreement can be reached by the parties merely to develop a recommendation and a proposed order that is signed by a mediator and rubber stamped by the assigned judicial officer, in violation of CA evidence code  § 1119, 1118-1121.

The recommendation and proposed order offers no value to the parties as it is considered hearsay under CA evidence code  § 1200 b.

In addition the CA evidence code, (the mandatory process by which a court of law HAS to apply the law), specifies that any statement or conduct that occurred in or originates during the course of mediation is confidential.

The evidence code concerning the practice of mediation is very specific as follows:


1115.  For purposes of this chapter:

(a) “Mediation” means a process in which a neutral person or persons facilitate communication between the disputants to assist them in reaching a mutually acceptable agreement.

(b) “Mediator” means a neutral person who conducts a mediation.

“Mediator” includes any person designated by a mediator either to assist in the mediation or to communicate with the  participants in preparation for a mediation.

(c) “Mediation consultation” means a communication between a person and a mediator for the purpose of initiating, considering, or reconvening a mediation or retaining the mediator.

1116.  (a) Nothing in this chapter expands or limits a court’s authority to order participation in a dispute resolution proceeding. Nothing in this chapter authorizes or affects the enforceability of a contract clause in which parties agree to the use of mediation.

(b) Nothing in this chapter makes admissible evidence that is  inadmissible under Section 1152 or any other statute.

1118.  An oral agreement “in accordance with Section 1118” means an oral agreement that satisfies all of the following conditions:

(a) The oral agreement is recorded by a court reporter or reliable means of audio recording.

(b) The terms of the oral agreement are recited on the record in the presence of the parties and the mediator, and the parties express on the record that they agree to the terms recited.

(c) The parties to the oral agreement expressly state on the record that the agreement is enforceable or binding, or words  to that effect.

(d) The recording is reduced to writing and the writing is signed by the parties within 72 hours after it is recorded.

1119.  Except as otherwise provided in this chapter:

(a) No evidence of anything said or any admission made for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation or a mediation consultation is admissible or subject to discovery, and disclosure of the evidence shall not be compelled, in any arbitration, administrative adjudication, civil action, or other noncriminal proceeding in which, pursuant to law, testimony can be compelled to be given.

(b) No writing, as defined in Section 250, that is prepared for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation or a mediation consultation, is admissible or subject to discovery, and disclosure of the writing shall not be compelled, in any arbitration, administrative adjudication, civil action, or other noncriminal proceeding in which, pursuant to law, testimony can be compelled to be given.

(c) All communications, negotiations, or settlement discussions by and between participants in the course of a mediation or a mediation consultation shall remain confidential.

1121.  Neither a mediator nor anyone else may submit to a court or other adjudicative body, and a court or other adjudicative body may not consider, any report, assessment, evaluation, recommendation, or finding of any kind by the mediator  concerning a mediation conducted by the mediator, other than a  report that is mandated by court rule or other law and that states only whether an agreement was reached, unless all parties to the mediation expressly agree otherwise in writing, or  orally in accordance with Section 1118.

1122.  (a) A communication or a writing, as defined in Section 250, that is made or prepared for the purpose of, or in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation or a mediation consultation, is not made inadmissible, or protected from disclosure, by provisions of this chapter if either of the  following conditions is satisfied:

(1) All persons who conduct or otherwise participate in the mediation expressly agree in writing, or orally in accordance with section 1118, to disclosure of the communication, document, or writing.

(2) The communication, document, or writing was prepared by or on behalf of fewer than all the mediation participants,  those participants expressly agree in writing, or orally in accordance with Section 1118, to its disclosure, and the  communication, document, or writing does not disclose anything  said or done or any admission made in the course of the mediation.

(b) For purposes of subdivision (a), if the neutral person who conducts a mediation expressly agrees to disclosure, that  agreement also binds any other person described in subdivision (b) of Section 1115.

1128.  Any reference to a mediation during any subsequent trial is an irregularity in the proceedings of the trial for the purposes of Section 657 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Any reference to a mediation during any other subsequent noncriminal proceeding is grounds for vacating or modifying the decision in that proceeding, in whole or in part, and granting a new or further hearing on all or part of the issues, if the reference materially affected the substantial rights of the party requesting relief.

This issue has already been addressed in numerous appeal court rulings including the Supreme Court which  has repeatedly stated that mediation confidentiality is absolute and cannot be used as evidence in any civil proceeding, which by definition also includes family law. The latest ruling on this matter occurred In Cassel v. Courier Superior Court, 51 Cal.4th 113, 244 P. 3d 1080 (January 13, 2011), where the client brought an action against attorneys who represented him in a mediation in a malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and breach of contract action.

At trial the attorneys made a motion in limine using the statute relating to mediation confidentiality (Cal. Evid. Code §1119(a), (b)) to exclude all evidence of communications between the client and the lawyer that were related to the mediation, including what was discussed in pre-mediation meetings and private communications between the client and attorneys during the mediation. The Supreme Court once again ruled that mediation confidentiality is absolute, following similar rulings already defined in Foxgate Homeowners Association, Inc., v. Bramalea California, Inc. (July 9, 2001) 26 Cal.4th 1, where the Supreme Court took a surprisingly strong stand on behalf of mediation confidentiality. In a 6-0 decision, it concluded that there were “no exceptions” to the mandatory mediation confidentiality rule under Evidence Code §1119, or to the statutory limits on reporting by a mediator under Evidence Code § 1121.

The Court rejected the argument that judicial construction of the statute was needed to avoid frustrating the legislative intent, or to avoid an absurd result. The clear language of the statute precludes mediator reporting, and requires strict confidentiality for all mediation communication.

We the public request the judicial council to abolish the forced mediation recommendation proposed orders  and their recommendations upon which the proposed orders are based and the forced mediation recommendation process when there has been no agreement reached during mediation.

4th District Division Two appeals court discards law in another OMG moment.

In a move that can only be described as OMG, the Court of Appeal 4th district division two has chosen to ignore a mandatory law.

The background of this case is that the Department of child support initiated a case when one parent moved the children to San Bernardino county and placed the children on welfare.  There is a major  problem with this little scenario as that parent has a drug manufacturing felony and is prohibited from obtaining welfare under the Calworks program pursuant to CAL. WIC. CODE § 11251.3, which the Department is fully aware of.

The other problem is that the San Bernardino Superior Court relied on the Riverside Superior court mediator’s recommendation as the basis of its order, which is void as there was no agreement in writing or at the hearing pursuant to evidence code section 1118-1121 and cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding under evidence code section 1119.

So the Department of child support initiated a case against the other parent who is an immigrant and had obtained a preliminary injunction against the parent who is a party to the child support case to pay a support order as he signed a contract pursuant to   8 U.S.C.A. § 1183a(a)(1)(A), which states  “Once a sponsor files an Affidavit of Support, the sponsor agrees to support the sponsored immigrant at an annual rate of “not less than 125 percent of the Federal poverty line ” .

The affidavit of support is a mandatory requirement if an adjustment of status occurs, when certain conditions exist to prohibit the sponsored alien from becoming a public charge on the welfare system, and requires a minimum support  to prevent that said immigrant becomes a public welfare charge.

The irony is that to be eligible for welfare assistance in the State of California the maximum income considered to be eligible for welfare is  130 percent of the Federal poverty guideline.

The department of child support in the County of San Bernardino Child support court proceeded with a case against a sponsored immigrant in the full knowledge that she is unable to obtain welfare assistance as she cannot be a public charge and in order to lower her support income to considerably beneath the poverty line.   The Attorney General’s office was involved just to ensure that the department of child support has the ability to create deportable offenses against the lowly immigrant who does not have the same rights as US citizens who obtains spousal support when they so helpfully pointed out in  their Respondent’s brief: ” The federal immigration and nationality act forbids admission to the United States of any alien who ‘is likely to become a public charge”.

Justice Richli who has a history of striking down laws as demonstrated here  repeated verbatim what the Department of child support put in  their brief: ” The federal immigration and nationality act forbids admission to the United States of any alien who ‘is likely to become a public charge’,” in effect recognizing the harmful impact of her opinion.

Justice Richli in her opinion even went one step further and inferred the concept that spousal support should perhaps be attached and should not be considered exempt income for child support cases despite precedent cases, such as In re Marriage of Corman 1997 59 Cal. App. 4Th 1492,  and declined to consider the sponsorship affidavit income as spousal support although numerous precedent cases have cited that this income is considered in lieu of or as spousal support and can only be obtained by a spouse or ex spouse who enforces the affidavit of support.  Love v. Love, 33 A.3d 1268 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) (The Pennsylvania Superior Court Upholds Federal Immigration Law in Spousal Support Matters); Cheshire v. Cheshire, 2006 WL 1208010 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (divorce does not invalidate affidavit of support); Iannuzzelli v. Lovett, 981 So. 2d 557 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (enforceability of affidavit of support survives divorce); Stump v. Stump, 2005 WL 1290658 (N.D. Ind. 2005) (former wife was entitled to enforce affidavit of support against former husband; wife was not required to receive means-tested benefits as a prerequisite to enforcement); Shumye v. Felleke, 555 F. Supp. 2d 1020 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (divorce does not terminate affidavit of support; affidavit may be enforced by immigrant wife); Younis v. Farooqi, 597 F. Supp. 2d 552 (D. Md. 2009) (divorce is not a condition under which sponsor’s obligations arising from affidavit of support can be terminated); In re Marriage of Sandhu, 207 P.3d 1067 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009).  Justice Richli also somehow invented two contracts when only one exists.

Discrimination does not describe the concept that Justice Richli has created, which affects millions of immigrants who are subject to a mandatory sponsorship affidavit. She has created a concept that is prohibited by Federal law, State law and contract law in order to ensure that the County of San Bernardino could proceed in action to create illegal deportable offenses, when the parent who is collecting welfare is prohibited from doing so under state law.

The ACLU has expressed a possible interest in becoming involved.

By San Bernardino and Riverside Superior Court News Posted in Family Law, News

“Among the matters she would like to take up is identifying high-risk cases and assigning them to specialized judges.”

The task of identifying high risk cases and assigning them to specialized judges was an endeavor envisioned by former Presiding Judge Sherrill Ellsworth as reported in a 2010 Press Enterprise article,

Two years later and with a new Presiding Judge the concerned family law public is still waiting for specialized judges to be appointed.  Instead the court has allowed the malevolent judicial rape and battery of Judge Dale Wells in family law to continue unchecked and unabated, despite public outrage and protest.

With the recent announcement that Judge Wells is leaving family law that does not solve the dilemma of parents and their children, that almost none of Judge Wells’ rulings have adhered to the relevant family law standard and that his rulings have caused tremendous suffering and placed children in harms way.

Perhaps the Riverside Superior Court would be kind enough to demonstrate that they have the public’s best interest at heart, encouraging the integrity and impartiality of the Riverside Superior Court judiciary and compensate the public for allowing such an individual to preside over family law by appointing a specialized judge to review all his case.

Judge Dale Wells, Riverside Superior Court, is leaving family law.

Sources have confirmed that Judge Wells announced during court proceedings last week that he will be leaving family law. He will be resuming his duties as a criminal law judicial officer in June.  There has been an overwhelming public demand by California taxpayers, who have experienced Judge Wells’ malicious family law rulings, that he be removed from the bench.  A petition has gathered more than 1300 signatures and complaints about his judicial conduct on the bench have been sent to the California Commission on Judicial Performance.

Litigants are encouraged to keep filing their complaint with the CJP.


Elkins Task force family law recommendations.

The judicial council has committed itself to adopting some of the recommendations from the family law Elkins task force.

The recommendations are based on responses received from members of the public, the legal and judicial community and can be accessed here,

The goal is to streamline services and to render the current court nightmare as more “litigant” and family friendly, a concept that does not currently exist in family law proceedings.

Unfortunately some judicial officers have never heard of the Elkins task force, their recommendations adopted by the Judicial Council, and they have never heard of the concept of evidentiary declarations which have a purpose; specifically in family court proceedings.  A court does have to consider the evidence presented in declarations, especially when those declarations are submitted under the penalty of perjury and reference the declarant as the recipient of certain documents, which are attached to the declaration.

By San Bernardino and Riverside Superior Court News Posted in Family Law, Law

Puppet of the Riverside Superior Court. Mediator Pierre Simpson fabricates statements to protect the Court.



Puppet of the Riverside Superior Court. Mediator Pierre Simpson fabricates statements to protect the Court..

via Puppet of the Riverside Superior Court. Mediator Pierre Simpson fabricates statements to protect the Court..

By San Bernardino and Riverside Superior Court News Posted in Family Law, Law

The Brainwashing of Children in Divorce.

Anyone who is involved in court proceedings knows what impact those court proceedings have on children.

Divorce happens, it is a fact of life. People move on and in most cases parents are quite capable of minimizing the impact on children, by acting like normal people, who can put children ahead of a desire to harm the other person.

In some cases that is not possible as there is a high conflict situation usually escalated by a court that prefers to pit parents against each other in a malicious game.  In those instances it is not unusual to have children used as tools and weapons against the other parent, where children are literally brainwashed against the other parent.  Some of the detrimental behavior that children are exposed to has a significant long term impact on children and includes the following:

Refusing to allow a child to engage in activities with the other parent and deliberately negatively colors any experience the child has with the other parent.

Limits phone or email usage deliberately preventing any contact.

Encouraging children to call the other parent by their first name.

Interrogating children once they return from the other parent’s home.

Holds resentment towards you in front of the children and exhibits derogatory and abusive behavior in front of children.

Teaches the child how to despise or hate another human being.

Labels themselves the “good” parent; label you the “bad” parent.

Tells the child false stories about their childhood.

Tells the child how he or she was victimized by you and your actions (while taking no blame at all for the divorce).

Teaches the child how to lie to you and to steal from you and encourages them to report back on anything occurring in your household.

Diminishes your extended family’s worth.

Says to you words like, “I always encourage her to see you;” “I’ve never told him you’re a jerk” while actually doing the precise opposite.

Neglects to have the child call you for your birthday, on New Year’s Eve, or other important dates.

Refuses to help the child reach and call/email/mail cards on relatives’ birthdays on your side of the family tree.

Uses a cellphone as a leash while the child is with you.

Reminds the child of all that he or she will be missing while with you and away from them.

Inflicts his or her unhappiness onto the child.

Attempts to reduce contact to that even below family court minimum standards and attempts to negatively control all contact.

Takes the child out of the area without a peep, while demands precise details whenever you travel with them.

Monopolizes the child’s time for hours on the phone.

Views any event in the child’s life– a distant Aunt’s birthday, a friend’s birthday, another child etc– as more important than time with you.

Is jealous of anything fun and memorable you do with the child (as they view the good times as a “threat”).

Gripes about things you’re doing as a parent to the child, but says nothing to you about it.

Uses the children as an adult companion and discusses adult topics with them.

Has severely emotional outbursts around the children.

It does not take a rocket scientist to determine that the long term impact on children exposed to the above behavior will affect their adult relationships. Children can’t but help share the brainwashing parent’s beliefs and contempt. It’s hatred that’s been taught and modeled to the child, and instilled in their very core.


By San Bernardino and Riverside Superior Court News Posted in Family Law, Law, News

Puppet of the Riverside Superior Court. Mediator Pierre Simpson fabricates statements to protect the Court.

An  incompetent mediation was conducted in the Riverside Superior Court.  Pierre Simpson who is employed in the Riverside Superior Court conducted the mediation. Some of the  statements that he alleged occurred during mediation are presented below for concerned parents.






Once again a mediator committed fraud and blatantly perjured himself.  The parent in this case never said that passports would not be handed to the other parent because they are invalidated.  The father never stated that this statement is true.  The mother in this case pointed out that she does not have the passports and that they were reported lost and stolen to the relevant agency that handles that concept and that are therefore invalidated and cannot be  used for travel in any capacity.  The mother also pointed out that the father took the original passports and left her in the belief they were stolen.  Pierre Simpson during mediation even pointed out that since both sets of passports are invalidated that they cannot be used for travel.

The minor children were dragged to mediation. Since Pierre Simpson blatantly lied about the parents statements, it is safe to assume that he did the same with the children. He claimed their statements were credible.

So let’s analyze what was asked:

The children were asked with whom  they wanted to live and the children were asked if they “feared” the other parent.  That question was asked as presented for one parent. Not the other parent. SO the mediator wanted to deliberately instigate  and incite fear in children against one parent.

One 5 year said that one parent yells at people to get away from them and sues everyone in Yucaipa. Now that parent only sees the children in the presence of the other parent, so that could not have happened  and a 5 year old child does not know what being sued means so this either implies severe coaching or that the mediator misstated what the children said.

Both children allegedly state that one parent tried to take them to their airport. What relevance this has no one knows. The children have never been taken to an AIRPORT. No reference to time and date was provided or where this allegedly was supposed to have occurred.  If one even gave this ludicrous statement credence, the fact that no travel occurred or that the children flew away would show the terrorizing nature of that statement, designed to fabricate a non existent event. However, during the custody trial held in this case the father admitted to instilling fear in children during court proceedings specifically relating to his constant fabricated allegations.


What this mediation exercise confirms is that two children are being terrorized and manipulated by a cruel and inhumane system and tortured against the CA rules of Court which defines the ethical conduct of mediation for children as follows:

h) Ethics

Mediation must be conducted in an atmosphere that encourages trust in the process and a perception of fairness. To that end, mediators must:

(1)Meet the practice and ethical standards of the Code of Ethics for the Court Employees of California and of related law;

(2)Maintain objectivity, provide and gather balanced information for both parties, and control for bias;

(3)Protect the confidentiality of the parties and the child in making any collateral contacts and not release information about the case to any individual except as authorized by the court or statute;

(4)Not offer any recommendations about a party unless that party has been evaluated directly or in consultation with another qualified neutral professional;

(5)Consider the health, safety, welfare, and best interest of the child in all phases of the process, including interviews with parents, extended family members, counsel for the child, and other interested parties or collateral contacts;

(6)Strive to maintain the confidential relationship between the child who is the subject of an evaluation and his or her treating psychotherapist;

(7)Operate within the limits of his or her training and experience and disclose any limitations or bias that would affect his or her ability to conduct the mediation;

(8)Not require children to state a custodial preference;

(9)Not disclose any recommendations to the parties, their attorneys, or the attorney for the child before having gathered the information necessary to support the conclusion;

(10)Disclose to the court, parties, attorneys for the parties, and attorney for the child conflicts of interest or dual relationships and not accept any appointment except by court order or the parties’ stipulation;

(11)Be sensitive to the parties’ socioeconomic status, gender, race, ethnicity, cultural values, religion, family structures, and developmental characteristics; and

(12)Disclose any actual or potential conflicts of interest. In the event of a conflict of interest, the mediator must suspend mediation and meet and confer in an effort to resolve the conflict of interest to the satisfaction of all parties or according to local court rules. The court may order mediation to continue with another mediator or offer the parties alternatives. The mediator cannot continue unless the parties agree in writing to continue mediation despite the disclosed conflict of interest.

The end result of this heinous fabricated stunt is that the Court made an order that mediation can no longer be done in this case without an order from the court.

By San Bernardino and Riverside Superior Court News Posted in Family Law, Law, News

State Auditor Faults AOC. Reblogged from Judicial Council Watcher

State Auditor Faults AOC

Posted on March 21, 2013

Letterhead Logo Smaller

March 21, 2013

Dear Members and Others,

It seems like yesterday when respected State Auditor Elaine Howle issued her scathing report on CCMS. To those in the Legislature and Governor’s Office that audit turned out to be a game changer. No longer would the judicial branch get a free pass on cost estimates, competency or managerial abilities. And thanks to our sister branches of government the plug was finally pulled on the most costly computer boondoggle our state has ever witnessed.

The day before yesterday the State Auditor released her findings on “Judicial Branch Procurement,” which echoes many of the observations made in that February 2011 audit of CCMS. Here is a link to that report. What follows are merely highlights from the audit:

  • The AOC’s semiannual report was “neither accurate nor complete with respect to data from the superior courts.”
  • The AOC “filtered certain transactions out of the report.”
  • There were instances “where the semiannual report was missing information…….and where the semiannual report provided inaccurate cost data.”
  • “During the course of our audit we relied on the AOC’s semiannual report….We stopped testing when it became clear that the report contained a number of inaccuracies.”

The Alliance wishes to allay any concerns you may have regarding these findings as the AOC has “asserted that it has corrected the problems that caused these errors and that they will not occur in future semiannual reports.” You will also be relieved to know that in many of these instances the AOC indicated “that the errors were the result of flaws in the extraction process that it has since corrected.” You will likewise be satisfied to hear that as to the other inaccuracies, omissions, and flat out wrong information provided to the State Auditor, “the program used to extract the courts’ data contained a programming error that has since been corrected.

As to the six local trial courts that were audited, we ask you to read the report for yourself and compare those findings against those of the AOC. The State Auditor appears to be committed to getting to the bottom of what is happening in the central office. On page 12 she writes: “Further, we anticipate conducting a review of the Phoenix system concurrent with our audit of the AOC’s procurement practices at a future date.” To that the Alliance says: Godspeed!

The Alliance would ask however, that the State Auditor not confine herself to AOC procurements only. A real independent audit must be conducted concerning the maintenance and construction programs. Too much money is on the line to give the bureaucracy that has a historical record of recklessness with public dollars the ability to conduct business as usual.

Which brings us back to the dysfunctional and inbred system of branch governance which is designed to turn a blind eye in order to speak with one voice. We need a truly diverse group of judges, democratically elected to appropriately manage and oversee the morass that is the AOC.


Alliance of California Judges

The Belief Fixation of Judge Dale Wells

Judge Dale Wells is fixated, rigid and inflexible. There are no other words to describe his belief rulings. He judicially retaliates against certain privileged litigants harming them and their children at length and refuses to address any rulings according to the law.

Indeed Judge Dale Wells manipulates the Court system to uphold his malicious rulings to perpetuate malicious judicial rape and battery and declares other Governmental agencies and state agencies as not credible, exceeding his role as a judge.

Judge Dale Wells escalates the situation between litigants and causes children further harm, due to the acrimony he causes and the chaos he fabricates in cases, while citing his belief at length.

Messiah Wells has expressed his malicious intent in his own sermons that he delivers at his church: “Romans 7:21-25 So I find this law at work: When I want to do good, evil is right there with me. For in my inner being I delight in Gods law; but I see another law at work in the my body, waging war against the law of my mind and making me a prisoner of the law of sin at work within my members. What a wretched man I am! Who will rescue me from this body of death? Thanks be to God—through Jesus Christ our Lord!

Perhaps the Riverside Superior Court would be kind enough to put litigants and the Court out of the misery of Judge Wells’ belief rulings, that harm parents and children, as he quite plainly is not equipped to deal with family law cases,  and uses the law as a maniuplative tool to play ping pong with litigants lives utilzing them as pawns in a  game of judicial retaliation and legal battery.



The belief Messiah, aka Judge Dale Wells strikes again, update Maha Abdel Rahim.

There was another hearing today in the ongoing saga of Maha Abdel Rahim and the Riverside Superior Court.  This hearing was brought to terminate Abdel Rahim’s right to see her son in  Puerto Rico.

Judge Dale Wells denied a notice and request for continuance by Abdel Rahim although she had presented that she could not appear and litigate on a pro per basis as she has no legal knowledge, she specified that the ACLU required more time in order to deal with the criminal charges against her in California and she specified that the extradition from Puerto Rico to California had been dismissed.  The court did not consider this relevant to proceedings.

The Riverside County District Attorney’s office was present at the hearing as well and the child recovery unit investigator testified that he had called Abdel Rahim requesting her to hand over her son in January of 2013 and was advised by her that the minor child could not travel as he was too ill. The District Attorney’s office mentioned how many times they had already been involved in this case.

Judge Dale Wells ordered sole legal and sole physical custody to the father with supervised visitation to the mother in the Coachella Valley by the father, a person he knows or by a professional at her expense, terminating the mother’s rights to her son. The father’s attorney had requested unsupervised visitation. Judge Wells also lamented the considerable media attention to this case and the misinformation by the Puerto Rico media and that he was not involved in the arrest of  Abdel Rahim.

After Judge Wells had created a new custody order,  Judge Wells went one step further and created a new issue that was not before the court as no order to show cause had been filed.

Judge Dale Wells specifically denies other litigants the right to bring up issues that are not before the court displaying his considerable bias and prejudice, but has no hesitation to bring up issues outside the scope of the set hearing. Judge Dale Wells specifically commented on how Abdel Rahim must feel, a mockery considering what has occurred in this case, and issued an order stating that the father has to hand over the child’s US passport to his attorney and cannot travel without the court’s consent.

This again was not an issue before the court and an empty gesture as Syria is one of the countries that does not require two party parental consent to obtain a child’s passport, a fact which is also specified on the US State Department website.

Maha Abdel Rahim will not be extradited to California.

The Puerto Rico ACLU just hours ago released a statement specifying that Abdel Rahim will not be extradited to California.

Justice Isabel Llopmert-Zeno, has issued an order dismissing the Puerto Rico’s Department’s petition for an extradition order based on the Governor of California not signing an extradition request.

Maha Abdel Rahim was arrested on the 10th of January 2013 based on an arrest warrant issued by the Riverside Superior Court, with a $ 200,000 bond, and spent 6 days in jail until the ACLU was able to secure her release without bail. 

The arrest warrant was issued by Judge Gary Tranberger of the Riverside Superior Court, based on the alleged failure by Abdel Rahim to hand over her son. The Riverside Superior Court District Attorney’s office only filed a complaint on 1/31/2013 and amended the complaint on 2/11/2013.

The question remains who will compensate Abdel Rahim for her pain and suffering due to false arrest, imprisonment and a clear case of malicious prosecution.